

The Peacock at Pregny Gate:

An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Five Key
International Organizations in Nonproliferation

*Monterey Institute of International Studies,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies' International Organizations for
Nonproliferation*

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AP	Additional Protocol
APB	Assistance and Protection Branch
APII	Amended Protocol II
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CNS	Center for Nonproliferation Studies
CPE	Lyon School of Chemistry, Physics and Electronics
CTBTO	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
CW	Chemical Weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
CWDF	Chemical Weapon Destruction Facility
CWPF	Chemical Weapons Production Facility
Eif	Entry into force
ER	External Relations
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GAP	Gender-mainstreaming Action Plan
GGE	Group of Governmental Experts
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
INTERPOL	International Police Organization
IONP	International Organizations in Nonproliferation
IO	International Organization
IPSS	International Professional Service Semester
MIIS	Monterey Institute of International Studies
MOTAPM	Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines
MS	Member State
NEP	Nonproliferation Education Program
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapons States
NWS	Nuclear Weapons States
NPT	Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PI	Public Information
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SP	State Party
TS	Technical Secretariat
UNDDA	United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Preface

The Monterey Institute of International Studies is dedicated to train the next generation of competent, innovative, and creative leaders equipped with the skills required to effectively address the challenges facing the international community in the 21st century. The Institute's Graduate School of International Policy Studies (GSIPS) offers several master's degree programs enabling tomorrow's policy makers to shape collective action through professional practice by specializing in policy analysis, management, negotiation and program evaluation tools related to human security, trade, and environmental policy. Monterey Institute students planning to pursue a career in the control, reduction, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction (including chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons) may earn a Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies during their course of study with GSIPS. This specialized training by nonproliferation experts affiliated with the Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) is unsurpassed and offers opportunities to students not only to work alongside top experts in the field, but also to gain invaluable, practical, on-the-job experience at international nonproliferation organizations.

The Graduate School's unique International Professional Service Semester (IPSS) program offers selected international policy students the opportunity to undergo six month assignments at international institutions to hone their skills and broaden their knowledge and understanding of the role of international organizations in addressing global challenges. While internships at international organizations are not new phenomena, they have indeed become a popular way for students in international political sciences to gain practical experience in the field. The IPSS program offers unsurpassed and well-established opportunities at a wide range of institutions worldwide as an integral part of the International Policy Studies master's degree program.

Prior to departure, students participating in this program undertake an intensive training seminar aimed at providing the skill set required to effectively work in an international environment. Moreover, each placement is tailored to fit the specific needs of the organization and the skills and experience of the participants. As such, students are assigned to work alongside faculty members and supervisors at international organizations to complete significant research projects that complement both the work of the assigned organizations and each participant's key areas of interest. The benefits to the participating organizations include a well-trained, junior staff officer and a professional research project related to the work of the organization. A two-week "cap-stone" seminar at the end of their professional assignment provides IPSS students with an opportunity to share their experiences and compare notes on how international organizations are committed to making the world a better place. In addition, they are also involved in the training of the next IPSS cohort through their insights in the day-to-day operations of these organizations.

The Institute and CNS have, for more than 10 years, supported the activities of key international nonproliferation and disarmament organizations including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organizations for the Prohibition for Chemical Weapons (OPCW) by providing well trained and deeply motivated nonproliferation students to work alongside international experts in pursuit of a world free of weapons of mass destruction. The five students who participated in the fall 2004 IPSS program actively contributed toward this

goal by providing stellar service to the IAEA, the OPCW, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (in New York and Geneva) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. The IPSS program offered unique opportunities to these students to not only gain insight into how these organizations operate, but also how they meet the increasingly difficult proliferation threats in the 21st century international security environment.

Since most international organizations tasked with overseeing international nonproliferation and disarmament obligations were designed during the Cold War era, they are continuously criticized from both sides of the political spectrum for being too bureaucratic, too large and ineffective, and lacking the ability to adapt to the changed international security environment. This report, compiled by the fall 2004 IPSS students based on their experiences while on assignment, provides valuable, fresh perspectives on the challenges their organizations face and how these challenges might be addressed to make the organizations more effective at accomplishing the important tasks they undertake. As the report demonstrates, these organizations and associated nonproliferation and disarmament treaties are indeed ineffective in dealing with the security challenges of the 21st century. However, based on their collective experiences, the five non-proliferation students conclude that this ineffectiveness is not necessarily due to their organizational weaknesses, but the lack of political will among Member States and a diplomatic impasse between their members were determining factors in their weakness. These findings led the students to recommendations, which, if implemented, could enhance the effectiveness of these organizations and prove their continued value in dealing with today's nonproliferation and disarmament challenges.

It has been a pleasure and indeed an honor to work with this small group of enthusiastic, energetic, dedicated, and well-prepared students. I am convinced that they are ready to take on leadership roles in continuing the work that many of the organizations that they served began more than a half century ago. They are now more acutely aware of many of the challenges that lie ahead. The opportunities offered to them through their training at the Monterey Institute's IPSS program have equipped them to take on this important task with an even deeper commitment to sustainable world peace.

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Executive Summary

This report identifies why the current nonproliferation regime is ineffective in dealing with the security challenges of the 21st century. Analysis is based on two factors: 1) the experiences of five students who served as part of the International Professional Service Semester (IPSS) at organizations charged with nonproliferation and disarmament and, 2) overall security challenges of the nonproliferation regime. After careful evaluation of the organizations using five observables: organizational life, gender mainstreaming, conflict resolution and negotiation skills, organizational partnering, and cross-cultural communication, it was determined that ineffectiveness in the nonproliferation regime was not due to incompetence on the part of these international organizations. In fact, the conclusion was drawn that the organizations each fulfill their mandates with relative efficacy. By factoring into the analysis the external security challenges of these organizations, a diplomatic impasse between Member States was determined to be the primary cause of ineffectiveness. Furthermore, this impasse is comprised of six elements: lack of political will, lack of leadership, waste/lack of funding, watered-down treaties, current relevance of treaties, and unutilized potential within the organizations observed. Based on these findings, the following five recommendations were made. First, less reliance should be made on multilateral negotiations, but on a bilateral or smaller group basis. Second, regional approaches would provide a more effective means of finding solutions than large worldwide, multilateral regimes. Third, the requirement of consensual agreement in multilateral, nonproliferation negotiations should be replaced with a single majority requirement. Fourth, the countries that enjoy the most political power should take a more proactive leadership position in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament. This would set a strong precedent that would encourage other countries to follow suit. Finally, in order to maximize potential, administrative and procedural inefficiencies within these international organizations should be addressed and streamlining should be implemented.

Introduction

This paper is designed to provide the reader with insight into the workings of the five most prominent international nonproliferation organizations in the world: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission (CTBTO PrepCom), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) in Geneva and New York.

It was through the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) International Professional Service Semester (IPSS) that the five authors of this paper, Cristian Ion (OPCW), Christopher Landers (CTBTO Prep Com), James McMonigle (IAEA), Risa Mongiello (UNDDA New York), and Rebecca Schauer (UNDDA Geneva), were trained in organizational assessment and sent to work in each respective organization for one semester. While on their internships, the IPSS students used five key observables to assess each organization's effectiveness within the nonproliferation regime. These five aspects of organizational assessment included: organizational life, cross-cultural communication, conflict resolution and negotiation, gender mainstreaming, and organizational partnering. Upon our return to the MIIS, they were tasked with a report that would provide insight into each of their organizations as well as findings that would shed light on the current effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime.

The following will provide the reader with a brief overview of each organization and their missions and mandates. It will be followed by a section encompassing more detailed information on the organizations through the observables that were used by the IPSS students. Next, the effectiveness of each organization in the nonproliferation regime will be examined followed by findings regarding how these organizations function, and how they perform within the international nonproliferation regime. Finally, the report will conclude with various recommendations from the five IPSS students concerning the improvement of the organizations and the nonproliferation regime as a whole.

Organizations

OPCW:

The OPCW was established by the States Parties (SPs) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and was given the following four main pillars of work: 1) destruction of chemical weapons (CW) and chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) (disarmament); 2) verification of non-production of CW (non-proliferation); 3) assistance and protection against chemical weapons; and 4) international cooperation for the peaceful use of chemistry. The functioning of the organization is decided by the States Parties through the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties. With 167 current Member States, the OPCW strives towards universality.

CTBTO Prep Com:

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission (CTBTO PrepCom) is a treaty that prohibits all nuclear explosions, for military as well as for civilian purposes. The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996, and was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996 when it was signed by 71 States, including the five nuclear-weapon States (NWS). It is designed to achieve its given mandate through the use of four verification technologies (Radionuclide sensors and laboratories, Hydro-acoustic sensors, Infrasound sensors, and Seismic sensors) and, when required, via On-Site inspections. As of 18 January 2005, a total of 174 States have signed the Treaty with 120 of those States having ratified the Treaty. Even with the almost universal support for the Treaty, entry in to force has still not been achieved. This is because entry into force requires 44 designated key States to sign and ratify the Treaty before entry into force. As of 18 January 2005 India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed and eight other States have still not ratified.¹ Once these remaining 11 States have all signed and ratified the Treaty, it will enter into force.

IAEA:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an independent organization and a member of the UN family. It was established in 1947 to promote “atoms for peace.” The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. Three main pillars - or areas of work - underpin the IAEA's mission: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and Verification. Along with assisting its Member States with everything from the irradiation of Testy Flies to the production of nuclear energy, a main function of the Agency is to verify States' compliance with its safeguards agreements as they are pledged to bring into force under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

UNDDA Geneva:

The primary functions of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Secretariat and Conference Support Branch in Geneva can be divided into four sections. First, the Geneva Branch provides administrative, secretariat and substantive support to the Conference on Disarmament and conferences on multilateral disarmament agreements that are held in Europe. Second, it prepares periodic political assessments of developments within the CD, and research papers, compilations and background papers for successive presidents of the CD. Third, it maintains a liaison with permanent missions, other international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Europe. Finally, it maintains a disarmament library and oversees the implementation of the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services program.²

¹ China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, USA, Viet Nam

² <http://disarmament2.un.org/dda-geneva.htm>

UNDDA New York:

The Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) was re-established in January 1998 under General Assembly resolution 52/12. It is mandated to promote the goal of disarmament and nonproliferation and to strengthen the disarmament regimes with respect to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as small arms and light weapons. UNDDA also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms. The department serves to support norm-building efforts in the area of disarmament through the work of the General Assembly and its First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, the CD and other bodies.

The vision of UNDDA is to promote global norms that are vital to the sustainable development, quality of life and ultimately the survival of this planet. UNDDA believes that the potential effects from the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – especially nuclear weapons – demand their elimination. The department works therefore to assist the UN, its Member States, and civil society in efforts to eliminate such arms.

Observables

The five observables used during the IPSS internship program provided us with a method by which we could observe our organizations. The observables included: organizational life, organizational partnering, conflict resolution and negotiation, gender mainstreaming, and cross-cultural communication. ‘Organizational life’ is an observable used to identify the structure of an organization, its efficiency level, and how it adapts to internal and external factors. ‘Organizational partnering’ is used to observe whether or not an organization collaborates with other organizations to fulfill its mission or goals. ‘Conflict resolution and negotiation’ serves to identify ways in which the organization uses certain techniques to negotiate or resolve problems related to the issues in its mandate. ‘Gender mainstreaming’ is used to observe the ways in which an organization deals with gender-related policies and issues. Finally, ‘cross-cultural communication’ is an observable used to identify the challenges, strengths and weaknesses of an organizations’ ability to maintain healthy communication in a multicultural environment. This section contains an assessment of the five organizations through the experiences of the IPSS students throughout the course of their professional assignments.

CTBTO:

The CTBTO Prep Com is structured in a format that forces the organization to function as a “machine.” If one part of the machine fails, the whole machine, or organization, fails. This is apparent in the political portion of the CTBTO by viewing the failure to gain entry into force of the treaty. Even though the organization, for the most part, resembles a machine, the organization has also shown some semblance of a brain in its ability to learn and grow. When a crisis effects the organization, the organization is able to respond by adjusting to policies and procedures. However, this capability to grow and learn is heavily stifled. All of the power of the CTBT is at the hands of the Member States and as a result, all important decisions are made by them. This allows for each State Party (SP) to either stimulate or stifle and progress or change

that may be required or desired. This has formed an environment where the CTBTO Prep Com is incapable of successfully completing the mandate that it has been given even though it possesses the technical capabilities to achieve the mandate. This total control at the State Party level has hindered the organization by generating an impasse for the restructuring of both the Treaty and the process that needed to achieve entry into force (eif.). This challenge has also weakened the organization by not allowing it to utilize heavy pressure to achieve eif. of the Treaty.

While the power structure of this organization has stifled and hindered it in its path to eif., the Member States have allowed the organization to change and grow internally. The change that they do allow, however, is related only to policy that affects the functions of the organization as opposed to internal policy. One such change that is currently being pursued is with the drive for a sexual harassment policy and improved awareness of sexual harassment. The push for this new policy is acceptable to the Member States and is being closely pursued by the management of the CTBTO Prep Com. However there is still difficulty enacting it due to resistance by a culturally diverse work force. The differing cultural ideas of sexual harassment have caused difficulties in establishing norms for the basis of this policy. This prolonged process of enacting the policy on sexual harassment demonstrated that, even with a limited amount of authority, the CTBTO Prep Com is still unable to develop policies to solve crises or internal disputes, particularly with respect to cross-culturally sensitive issues.

As opposed to the top-down policy being developed for sexual harassment, policy regarding conflict resolution is being established by the staff of the CTBTO Prep Com. Currently, the CTBTO is striving for third “contracted” parties to be utilized in conflict resolution among the staff and management of the organization. These two developing policies show that the CTBTO Prep Com is given power as long as the policies remain internally based. On the other hand, all of the decisions affecting the outward policies of the CTBT and the CTBTO Prep Com are in the hands of the States. Even though it is the partnerships of the States and the CTBTO Prep Com that have prevented the organization from coming into existence, it is this relationship between the States and the CTBTO Prep Com that allows for the existence of the Prep Com. It has also laid the ground work for the power structure and hierarchy of control within the CTBTO Prep Com.

The above-mentioned facts may lead one to believe that the CTBTO, while slowly making progress towards its mandate, is not an efficient or effective organization. It is unable to adapt and adjust to issues or to quickly and properly engage any new policy that may be agreed upon. This is not the case though. The CTBTO Prep Com is still a young organization that is growing, advancing and striving to play a role in the international nonproliferation regime. It is the overly diverse objectives of the States Parties that have created the environment that is not supportive for the success. There are many areas in which, from an outside view, the CTBTO Prep Com would appear to be an inefficient and nonproductive organization, but it is from within that one can see the true workings of the organization making progress. It is the requirement of having to please too many Member States that has hindered the CTBTO Prep Com from making vital changes for achieving entry into force and has stifled the nonproliferation community by blocking the invaluable benefits that may be produced by the CTBTO. It is in this light that one can deduce that the organization, minus the Member States authoritarian control, would be a thriving organization. However, since the organization is based on the participation of the Member States, it must abide by their control, and it continues to lack the ability to grow.

IAEA:

The IAEA is a large bureaucracy with an overwhelming task. With a budget for 2005 of nearly \$280 million, it employs more than 2,200 professionals from over 90 countries to assist its 137 Member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and nuclear security and safety. Additionally, it verifies State's commitments under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that safeguarded nuclear materials and technology are not used for military purposes. There are 232 safeguards agreements with the Agency concluded with 148 States. However, in assessing its organizational life through the identified observables, its scores ranged from excellent to poor.

The IAEA is a model machine-organism with a slight aspect of a brain. While the IAEA is far too slow and cumbersome to be effective in the continually changing security environment, it has however made attempts to update itself. In response to the shocking discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it initiated the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Agency's Safeguards Agreement, which grants it improved powers and tools to analyze States' nuclear programs. While the AP is indeed a development, it still falls short of today's needs. The Agency is also at least considering other challenges like that of a supposedly civilian, but closed, nuclear fuel cycle, which could provide the sensitive material and know-how to build a bomb. It has convened an expert's group to look into possible solutions for the issue. Because of its multinational nature in which it must give respect and equal power to all Member States, who are quite often obstructionists. In doing so, it lacks the ability to be innovative and progressive. Because the IAEA does not function solely as a cumbersome machine, the Agency rates a good score.

The IAEA commitment to "Atoms for Peace" and its vision for international security causes it to partner with 65 like-minded organizations. These relationships create a synergy for the promotion of joint goals and interests. On the side of technical assistance, the IAEA currently is involved in 132 approved Coordinated Research Projects involving 1,818 active research contracts and agreements. Many of these technical cooperation projects are carried out in partnership with States domestic laboratories and national nuclear energy agencies and nearly \$80 million is devoted to this goal. In 2003, projects involved 3,121 expert and lecturer assignments, 2,848 meeting and workshop participants, 2,107 participants in training courses and 1,411 fellows and visiting scientists.³ On the side of verification and security, the Agency partners with many organizations, bodies and agencies. Examples include other UN family members like the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs and the Conference on Disarmament for diplomatic events like Preparatory Commissions and Review Conferences for the NPT. The Agency also verifies the abolition of nuclear weapons in Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and teams up with international organizations like INTERPOL and security organizations like the European Union's Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. These relationships help combat the transport of nuclear material across borders in the battle against nuclear terrorism. The aforementioned relationships are just a sample of the Agency's partnering, but, it is clear the IAEA is the focal point for international nuclear cooperation. The Agency is effective in its use of partnerships.

Like many multinational bodies, the Agency works hard for effective cross-cultural communication. Aside from the inevitable, but rare, intra-personal difficulties between cultures, the Agency succeeds in achieving an atmosphere of mutual respect and equality for all races,

³ IAEA website: www.iaea.org

peoples, cultures and nations. The Secretariat is very careful to be impartial in its policy-making to the interests of certain Member States. Here again the Agency receives high marks.

As for gender mainstreaming, the Agency is far ahead of similarly-sized and tasked bodies. It has policies and practices in place, which address the issue, but more prominence must be given for it to truly be successful. Arms control is notoriously an old boy's club and the IAEA is no exception. While the ratio of women to men in the Agency is on the surface apparently equal, closer inspection reveals that men occupy a large majority of the top policy, and especially technical positions. Women make up much of the support and clerical positions. But the good news is that goals have been set for a more equal representation among genders and the Agency is becoming ever more cognizant of how its policies affect gender. In this respect, a mediocre performance is delivered. The Agency possesses a policy, but lacks its implementation.

Conflict resolution can be observed in the Secretariat's two policy bodies, the annual General Conference, involving all Member States, and the 35-member Board of Governor's meeting, which convenes five-times per year. These two bodies are subject to political gridlock and protracted diplomatic speak delivering little substance. However, as previously mentioned the responsibility here again lies within the States Parties. Negotiating safeguards agreements, directed by the Agency, has been on the whole unsuccessful. A disappointing 63 States have an AP in force, which means a remaining 129 States do not have an AP. Therefore, more than 2/3 are still under the "old" and proven ineffective safeguards system. And of those States, a further 42 are without any IAEA safeguards. These States are in violation of the NPT, which stipulates that after signature, a State has a 180-day period to begin negotiations and 18 months to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency. In many of these cases, many years have passed, as has been the case with Saudi Arabia who signed a safeguards agreement in October of 1988 but has yet to bring it into force. In light of this, the Agency receives another average mark.

OPCW:

When assessing the OPCW through the five pre-determined IPSS observables, it can be noticed that, the OPCW could overall perform at a high level within the nonproliferation regime, although there are a few organizational glitches that may hamper the quality and quantity of the work done by the OPCW. The OPCW has the capability to perform most of the tasks that it is required of it by the States Parties, if it is given more independence and impartiality by the Member States.

According to the Monterey intern's observation, the OPCW acts as a machine-like organization due to the high level of bureaucracy noticed at all levels of the decision making scale. Within the Technical Secretariat (TS), decision-making and flow of information take a very long time and follow a very bureaucratic process. A lot of time is wasted in decision making due to the very hierarchical set up of the OPCW. All major decisions regarding the functioning of the OPCW must be approved by States Parties. Such approval may never be achieved due to various political interests of each State Party, or may take a very long time. The power of such decision is therefore watered down or is lost in the process. This slow process affects the quality and quantity of the work of every single staff member in the TS. The very independent set up of work for each employee and of each branch gives a feeling of lack of organization and cooperation among people and branches. However, it was noticed that the flow of information and the decision-making process could function well in case of emergency.

Most of the negotiations at OPCW are done between various branches within the TS and SPs regarding various issues in the implementation of the CWC. The two parties are supposed to be on the same side of the barricade and work towards the implementation of the Convention and the good functioning of the OPCW, but most often the two have different interests. Therefore, positioning negotiations occur most of the time. Such negotiations are also more balanced towards States Parties, since the latter are represented by skilled diplomats and negotiators, and Member States are the ultimate decision makers. The TS staff may also agree on detrimental agreements to the OPCW with States Parties, because they feel that they cannot offend any State Party.

The overall effectiveness of the OPCW and decision-making process is not hampered by cross-cultural communication. Decision makers within the organization are somewhat skilled diplomats who are used to the diplomatic speech of various delegations. Cross-cultural communication may become a problem however within the daily functioning of the TS. No cross-cultural communication training is provided to new staff members, and the vast majority of the staff may have never worked within an international setting. The staff is not aware of behavior and work style differences among cultures and tends to see everything from an ethnocentric perspective. The lack of cross-cultural awareness creates misunderstanding and frustration in the daily working environment at OPCW. However, the creation and use of a common OPCW language pulls somewhat the OPCW staff together in difficult situations and makes communication much easier.

The OPCW partners at various levels with agencies in the United Nations family as well as other international and national organizations within the nonproliferation field. Such partnering is seen through participation at different conferences or different UN meetings on issues of interest such as nonproliferation or the fight against terrorism. Each branch within the TS may have some connections of their own with similar branches within other organizations. However, this partnering is rendered less effective due to lack of information sharing. The OPCW does not share too much information with other organizations and vice versa. Duplication of efforts thus appears and lessons learned are not shared with other organizations. The OPCW does not take criticism well, and presents itself to the outside world as a perfect body. The NGOs that work closely with the OPCW tend to also overlook the problems at the organization and present it in a overly positive way. Partnering appears therefore on an ad-hoc basis depending on the situation, and the OPCW could work well with organizations within and outside the nonproliferation regime if required.

The OPCW has no program to discuss gender mainstreaming. No policy for its implementation exists. This issue is unfamiliar to OPCW staff. Gender imbalance could also be noticed, with mostly men occupying the decision-making positions, while the majority of women tend to be in the administrative positions. A decision on gender mainstreaming is expected only from States Parties, and the TS is not ready or willing to propose any change in policy in this regard.

UNDDA Geneva:

The organizational structure of the United Nations is that of a “machine”. It has a dense, bureaucratic nature that hinders change. The CD Secretariat and Conference Support Branch in Geneva mirror that structure to a certain extent. However, the small size of the Geneva Branch does allow for incremental improvements in certain areas. For example, even though there are

strict guidelines that address official documentation, there has been evidence of “brain” activity in this arena. National Annual Reports that are submitted by SPs to Amended Protocol II (APII) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) may now be submitted in electronic format, which makes them more accessible to the other SPs. The Geneva Branch also attempts to be as apolitical as possible, due to the fact that it does not want to appear biased toward one State Party or another for which it provides services.

Gender mainstreaming policies that were implemented within the UN system are not necessarily discussed or addressed at the Geneva Branch. The office has its own professional and personal harmony with respect to gender mainstreaming that does not appear to require further intervention, although it should be noted that currently all of the high-level positions are held by men. UN policies have been used on occasion in other offices in order for a country to obtain greater representation, by proposing a female candidate and then “crying gender mainstreaming” in order to ensure that their countryperson will have a greater advantage in acquiring an employment posting.

Gender mainstreaming efforts appear to be alive and well, and most valued, at the field level in terms of small arms and light weapons (SALW). However, it must be noted that this may be due to the fact that there is a very strong humanitarian element involved in the issue of SALW. Nonproliferation and disarmament issues that focus on WMD do not involve the same emphasis on gender mainstreaming action as SALW. The relationship between the increased role of women and children and an increase in program effectiveness was vocalized at a small arms and light weapons seminar on weapons collection held by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and during the meetings held on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). There is also a handbook specifically on the importance of gender mainstreaming in programs on anti-personnel landmine de-mining that is produced annually or biannually.

Most negotiations and conflict resolution tactics and styles took place at the conferences held in Geneva. In short, diplomatic negotiations are rarely interest-based. Either States Parties have strict instructions from their capitals that provide for little wiggle-room, or they are simply trying to “play the game.” The bottom-line is that a lot of time and money are wasted so that in many cases watered-down, weak agreements can be reached that provide little strengthening of the current security regime.

Not many partnerships exist between the Geneva Branch and other organizations, in the sense of joint participation on projects. International Organizations (IOs) and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) are either welcomed or grudgingly tolerated at conferences, depending on the topic under discussion, but they do not partner, per se, with the Geneva Branch. However, part of the mandate of the Geneva Branch includes liaising with these organizations. Due to the necessity of maintaining a neutral position, it is unlikely that the Geneva Branch would partner in the true sense of the term with any organizations, although at the conference level there has been evidence of partnering between States Parties and NGOs. The end result of one particular example of this partnering is the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention that was negotiated outside of the UN framework. The Geneva Branch itself works very closely with States Parties, because they are mandated to provide support to them during meetings of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and other conferences held in Europe.

Finally, the Geneva Branch consists of staff from 12 different national origins, but there were only rare incidences of cross-cultural integration difficulty. For example, a male member of the staff was from a male-dominant culture, and initially regarded photocopying and filing to

be a task that the female staff should execute. However, the female staff in the office gently informed him that each person was responsible for making their own photocopies and doing their own filing, and over time the male staff member eventually accustomed himself to this new culture. All of the staff of the Geneva Branch spoke English very well, which is the working language of the office, and there does not appear to be serious communication problems. Perhaps this is because they have worked within the UN culture for several years, and therefore have become accustomed to the culture in which the general functioning is carried out. The staff understands the role that they play very well, and in general they are excellent at carrying out their work, as well as working together. There are some cultural stereotypes about certain delegations, but they do not appear to play a large role in negotiations. Political power is to be the most important quality with respect to diplomatic negotiations.

UNDDA New York:

The five observables used during the IPSS internship program provided a method by which one could observe the U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA). The observables that provided the most insight into the work of UNDDA were organizational life, partnering, gender mainstreaming and cross-cultural communication. Of the five observables, these four helped clarify how the department functions.

The organizational life of UNDDA gave an interesting insight into the intricacies of the UN as an organization. Due to the fact that UNDDA is mandated under the Charter of the United Nations, its flexibility is restricted. As it is part of the Secretariat, UNDDA is not permitted to make analytical or subjective recommendations to Member States. They are simply there to facilitate the First Committee of the General Assembly and to assist Member States in the implementation of resolutions with respect to disarmament. In some cases, this situation caused a strain on the relationship between the Secretariat, DDA and Member States. While delegates often made requests that DDA could not always fulfill, DDA simultaneously made requests of the Member States which delegates claimed they could not fulfill either. Generally speaking, there was a sensitive relationship between UNDDA in the Secretariat and the Member States that, at times, put a strain on States' ability to implement resolutions and fulfill their obligations.

With respect to organizational partnering, UNDDA had a strong relationship with several international organizations and NGOs. They worked closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Amongst the NGO's that were significant partners with UNDDA were Reaching Critical Will (RCW), the Women's League for International Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the Arms Control Association, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. UNDDA's relationship with these NGO's was highly valued because they maintained more flexibility than the UN to address some of the major challenges facing disarmament and international security. With regard to the ability of the UN to tackle some of the major external security challenges of nonproliferation, disarmament and international security, maintaining a balanced relationship with the International Organizations and the NGOs will be essential in the future because the UN cannot do it all on its own.

Gender mainstreaming was also a significant aspect of UNDDA. Because of the Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan (GAP) put forward in 2003, UNDDA was working hard to raise

awareness about the gender mainstreaming issue. For example, surveys and workshops were conducted to educate Member States on the value of gender mainstreaming in the area of disarmament. Some of the issues raised were international responses to gender issues, the role of women in international security, and gender considerations for illicit trade and transfer of small arms and light weapons. UNDDA was one of the most progressive departments at the Secretariat in this field as few other departments had similar programs. In fact, in his report to the Security Council on “Women, Peace and Security”, the Secretary General noted that UNDDA’s Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan was an integral part of the UN’s efforts implement resolution 1325 (2000), which calls for women’s equal participation with men and their full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

In terms of cross-cultural communication, the UN in New York has adapted well to the various different cultures within its structure. As most delegates and staff members in the Secretariat are aware of people’s various nationalities and languages, the organization does a good job of maintaining open communication. Most people at the UN were, for the most part, politically correct and sensitive when speaking about or interacting with colleagues from different cultures. There was some tension, however, between Middle Eastern representatives and some Western nations. It appears that there are still some areas of cross-cultural communication that the UN has yet to address.

Regarding conflict resolution and negotiation, UNDDA participated in many conferences that involved these two concepts. Though it cannot partake in the actual negotiations between Member States, UNDDA is mandated to help facilitate the process when the need arises. As conflict resolution and negotiation are inherently part of the UN system, they play an important role in the ways in which the organization operates.

Effectiveness of Organizations within the Nonproliferation Regime

These organizations do not work in a vacuum; they act within the nonproliferation regime. Their structure, decision making and functioning affect the entire nonproliferation regime. At the same time, their capacity to conduct work is affected by external factors, such as the treaties that they oversee or the national security interests of some Member States. In the following section, the IPSS students assess the suitability of these organizations in the larger context of the nonproliferation regime, as well as external factors that impact each organization. Each organization was designed for a specific set of challenges such as prevention of nuclear tests, verification and elimination of WMD by state actors and they all have a specific role in the nonproliferation field. Since September 11, 2001, the challenges facing these organizations have increased and their roles are not as clear as before. If past methods of addressing security challenges continue to be relied upon, these organizations will face an increased number of challenges within the international arena, such as disarmament, use of WMD by non-state actors, and even the effect of natural disasters on their mandate. The effectiveness of these organizations is measured against the way they address and handle both the new and old challenges.

CTBTO:

The CTBTO Prep Com is an organization that utilizes cutting edge technologies at the core of its existence. These high technologies allow the organization to verify and monitor a

nuclear detonation. This capability has made the CTBTO Prep Com an organization that is approaching nonproliferation in a different manner than that of any other organization in existence. It is through this new unique manner of verification that hopes have been ignited for the further enhancement of the nonproliferation regime.

Since CTBTO Prep Com is a technically based organization, it has begun to pre-establish the required verification regime and, in doing so, has proven to be more than able to perform the tasks that are demanded by its mandate. Currently, only fifty percent of the total required verification regime has been completed, but the capabilities of these verification technologies thus far have proven to be far greater than what was expected. These different technologies working together has created a synergy of information that provides the CTBTO Prep Com with enough global coverage of the world that it is certain that the capabilities of the CTBT's verification regime will fulfill the requirements mandated by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In this respect, the CTBTO Prep Com will eventually be an organization that has the capacity to effectively achieve its mandate and produce accurate and valuable results once the treaty enters into force. While the CTBTO will, in the future, be an organization that serves to improve the nonproliferation regime, it is still only a preparatory commission and will not be an organization until entry into force of the Treaty is achieved.

The fact that the CTBT has not been able to acquire the needed signatures and ratifications for entry into force is a sign that there are still significant problems affecting the capability of the CTBT Prep Com. The inability of Member States to work cohesively with the CTBTO to develop new, effective policies is stunting the Treaty and the organization from fulfilling their objectives. The only actions States Parties are willing to take are weak and unproductive. The over diverse population of State actors is hindering the CTBTO from coming into existence. The Member States of the CTBT and a few nonparticipation States have failed (to date) to take the needed steps⁴ to achieve the Treaty's entry into force and have generated a stalemate for progress. This failure is due to a large, diverse body of Member States who all share varying agendas, goals and needs. While consensus through a vast multilateral forum is a good vision, it is this consensus and idea of group support that is hindering the development of the CTBTO and is generating a development barrier in the international nonproliferation regime.

IAEA:

While the IAEA stands as the most prominent and valuable multilateral nonproliferation actor; it is however fundamentally ill suited for today's security environment. As well as assisting Member States in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the Agency is the executor of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the most widely adhered to international treaty. It authenticates States safeguards commitments pursuant to the NPT through an inspection and verification regime. It has set the precedents for its inspection abilities since its establishment in 1947, but this central operation has been proven inadequate in recent years.

As an organization the IAEA functions quite well, considering the size of its bureaucracy and the stifling constraints imposed, but its impotence arises from its multinational nature, which inhibits it from undergoing the necessary revision of its functions to meet the realities of the security challenges in the 21st Century. The Agency, in much the same way as the entire

⁴ Effective steps to either acquire the needed signatures and ratification, or steps to alter the Treaty to allow for entry into force of the Treaty.

nonproliferation regime, has failed to properly address terrorism, advances in technology, proliferation black-markets and rogue states intent on acquitting nuclear arsenals. The IAEA's unique role makes it an easy target for criticism but in all fairness it is the international community, and in particular Member States, which are the real antagonists. States Parties provide the Agency with its mandate and their consent must be gained for decisions to be taken. It is because of UN-style diplomatic gridlock, a lack of political will, and leadership that the Agency faces irrelevancy. In providing security to the nuclear threat, the Agency's verification and safeguards as well as its security and safety tools are as effective as a fire extinguisher in a wildfire.

The IAEA has done little about the threat of nuclear terrorism. Possibly the best resource that the Agency provides is its database on the trafficking of nuclear materials. Nearly two-dozen cases of nuclear smuggling have been confirmed but the database is made up of only *reported* incidents. And oftentimes events go unreported for political reasons. Although the Agency has launched a campaign to support legal frameworks, provide training and education and provide coordination for the international community, the pertinent and immediate issue of terrorism clearly must be met with far more.

The IAEA is the NPT's enforcer and the incline of the Agency's already uphill battle has recently grown steeper. The Treaty's Grand Bargain, trading States technical assistance for the pledge not to develop nuclear weapons, has been transformed into its fundamental flaw. Rapid advances in technology and the wide availability of nuclear weapons design have made it ever easier for nuclear capable states, especially with a fully developed fuel cycle, to break out with a nuclear arsenal. Currently under the NPT, a state can virtually have a complete weapon absent only a screwdriver's turn, a calibration or a gyroscope. At which point a state could withdraw from the NPT all the while having benefited from the Agency's assistance and declare itself a nuclear power. Today the difference between a civilian and military nuclear program is only that of intent. The Agency must act as the guarantor of technical assistance and nonproliferation; the two are becoming mutually exclusive. And again the international community lacks the political will to change the rules so as not permit this dangerous scenario. In response, the Agency has acted with too little too late. An expert's group has been established to look into possible solutions, but even at this early stage gridlock has engulfed the group even before it is allowed to proceed to the Board of Governors and eventually on to the NPT Review Conference—its likely forum for discussion. But any possible solution would only be a partial solution. It has been proven that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is only as strong as its weakest link so clearly a comprehensive plan could be the only true option. And any option would most likely be killed in the diplomatic arena.

The Khan style proliferation black market in which over 20 states were involved is outside the reach of the Agency particularly because its origin, Pakistan, is not a Member State nor is it a signatory of the NPT. This is not so much the responsibility of the Agency but it is a symptom of the fatally ill nuclear nonproliferation regime which desperately requires the teeth to tear after international criminals who spread history's most dangerous weapon.

For four decades the Agency has been tasked with keeping non-nuclear weapons states from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, and until recent years it has been relatively successful. However, it could do little to stop nuclear proliferation to states who abstained from the NPT. The unequal and un-universal NPT received the near fatal blow when Israel, India and Pakistan declared themselves nuclear powers. The world looked on with few options for recourse since these States never signed the Treaty. This development led to the proliferation domino

effect. Furthermore, the discovery of Iraq's previously unknown and highly advanced program after the Persian Gulf War revealed the realities of the Post-Cold War Era—that new rogue states are destined to develop nuclear arsenals. A short time later North Korea, after years of non-compliance with its safeguards agreements, dispelled Agency inspectors and removed seals from its nuclear materials. Subsequently, it abrogated its commitment to the NPT and declared that it possessed the bomb. Additionally, Iran is after 18 years of broken commitments and noncompliance as well is dangerously close to developing the first Shiite Islamic Bomb. The development or near development of nuclear weapons by these IAEA Member States proves the ineffectiveness of the NPT and its watchdog the IAEA. These recent acts of proliferation have edged the world closer to a nuclear tipping point.

The IAEA's system of safeguards has yet to arrest or alert the world to a nascent nuclear weapons programme. The most successful inspections activity to date has been UNMOVIC, the joint IAEA-UN Security Council mandated inspections in post-Persian Gulf War Iraq. UNMOVIC uncovered Iraq's clandestine program, but only because it was granted far-reaching powers, which is absent from the IAEA. Even with the most advanced verification tool, acceptance is voluntary and once under the AP, access to sites and materials is still controlled by the government, which can still play the Saddam's shell game. Furthermore, states are not obligated in any way to sign or bring into force an AP. Again, this is an issue for the Member States, which have provided the agency with this inadequate system but have charged it with such an important task.

OPCW:

The OPCW was created to oversee the implementation of the CWC. However, the CWC was negotiated during the Cold War era, a time that addressed different security challenges than the ones of today, and that had two main actors: the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the CWC in itself is not well adapted for the security challenges in the 21st century. The best example represents the fight against terrorism. According to statements made by the OPCW, the implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons as a whole can be considered part of the fight against terrorism. However, nowhere within the Convention are the concepts of 'terrorism' or 'non-state actors' mentioned. Therefore, the OPCW fights terrorism through breaches and interpretation of text in the CWC. Moreover, additions or changes to the Convention are nearly impossible since some States Parties oppose adding reference to terrorism in the CWC or even the whole idea of using the CWC to fight terrorism.

The OPCW was set up mainly for verification purposes to oversee the reduction and total elimination of chemical weapons. This area is still very important in the new security environment. However, the verification conducted by the OPCW is limited by the number of inspections that can be carried out yearly and by the lack of funds made available by States Parties. These inspections are announced, and no challenge inspections have ever taken place, nor do they seem likely in the near future.⁵ The process of reducing the number of chemical weapons (CWs) is far behind schedule. Currently, only one of the six States Parties with declared chemical weapons is on schedule. Moreover, some of these States Parties do not even have a single Chemical Weapon Destruction Facility (CWDF).

⁵ "Challenge Inspection" is an inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party requested by another State Party.

Non-compliance with various parts of the Convention runs high among States Parties, and they are not too eager to fulfill their obligations in the near future. The degree of non-compliance is dependent on the issue, but it is highest in the area of assistance and protection. Such areas can no longer be overlooked, due to the increasing danger of the possible use, or threat of use, of chemical weapons by non-state actors. Also the increasing threat of natural disasters that could cause chemical accidents poses serious hazards. The lack of political will to use the full potential of the organization is high among States Parties.

Although the OPCW strives toward universality, a number of countries of concern are still outside of the Convention. These countries cannot be verified and the OPCW has no power over them. It is also hard to believe that these countries will agree to be bound by the Convention in the near future. This fact alone renders the OPCW very ineffective.

UNDDA Geneva:

The CD Secretariat and Conference Support Branch in Geneva deals with an entire spectrum of security challenges, from WMD to conventional weapons. It offers support to the CD, in which there are four main agenda items: nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, halting fissile material production, and the non-weaponization of outer space. It also offers support to the annual meetings of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The Geneva Branch does not have the power in and of itself to affect the nonproliferation regime. Its role is that of a Secretariat. Its primary function is to service the conferences that are held in Geneva and ensure that all necessary services, such as documentation and interpretation, are provided so that the administrative and technical aspects of the conferences run smoothly. To this end, the Geneva Branch is highly capable and its work is invaluable.

The SPs are ultimately responsible for the successes or failures within the nonproliferation regime. Negotiations within the CD have been stalled since negotiations ended on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, which has yet to enter into force. Although the Monterey intern only attended the final meeting of the final session for 2004, it can be stated with reasonable authority that substantial progress is not expected for the 2005 session. Even though the diplomats offered strong statements at this final meeting in terms of the necessity of the CD and its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, the truth remains that it is not effective. Obtaining consensus among 65 members is for all practical purposes impossible, due to a small number of countries who are unable to reach agreement even about the order of the agenda items. Because the CD is unable to reach consensus on its agenda, serious shadows can be cast upon its ability to reach consensus on substantive issues.

Meetings held in Geneva on Certain Conventional Weapons over the course of the internship included the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) meeting, the meeting on Amended Protocol (AP) II of the Convention, and the annual Meeting of States Parties (MSP). The only substantial decision taken was to invite legal experts to the 2005 annual meetings of the GGE in order to provide information on the humanitarian laws associated with explosive remnants of war. To the disappointment of the NGOs present at these meetings, no decisions were taken that called for the start of negotiations on a protocol for explosive remnants of war, which would be legally binding for Member States. Due to the fact that AP II, which deals specifically with anti-personnel landmines, was considered too weak by some, the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention was eventually established outside of the UN framework. This

is perhaps the strongest example of the UN's ineffectiveness in dealing with security challenges, and could also herald a forthcoming change in how multilateral treaties or legally binding protocols are negotiated. There is the possibility that if substantial progress is not made to the satisfaction of the NGOs on explosive remnants of war (ERW) or on mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) that they may attempt to develop stronger mechanisms in the same fashion as the AP Landmine Convention was established—outside of the UN system.

Finally, the Meeting of States Parties (MSP) to the BWC was also held in Geneva during December 2004. Proposals that were made during its summer governmental experts meeting had been summarized by the President of the meeting prior to the start of the MSP, and little substantive progress was made at this final meeting for 2004. However, one big cause for debate was on whether or not a recommendation should be made, on behalf of the BWC conference, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the possibility of strengthening his mechanism to evaluate whether an outbreak of disease was due to a bioterrorist or a bioweapons attack rather than having natural origins. In the end, no consensus was reached. Many States present seemed to be awaiting the 2006 Review Conference, and felt that no substantial work would be done until that time.

In summary, the Geneva Branch participates directly towards the effectiveness of the functioning of the nonproliferation and disarmament machinery. Biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines, anti-vehicle mines, explosive remnants of war, and the issues under discussion at the CD are all security challenges that fall within its mandate in terms of the support it provides to the meetings that address these issues. However, the States Parties are ultimately responsible for the progress that is made in these domains. At the present time, there are large stumbling blocks within the CD and on the negotiations of the BWC, and only small steps are being made regarding Certain Conventional Weapons.

UNDDA New York:

UNDDA faces many significant challenges with respect to the current security environment of the 21st century. One of the greatest challenges is simply to define the problems that exist in the areas of international security, disarmament and nonproliferation. Only when the problems are identified will it become clearer as to how UNDDA should address them.

A major external security challenge is the shift in focus from nuclear disarmament to terrorism in the last four years. Due to certain recent events, the Security Council, the General Assembly, the First Committee and the Member States have moved away from the idea of disarmament being the key to international security and more toward the concept of counter- and anti-terrorism. For example, the creation of Committee 1540, based on Security Council Resolution 1540, has required *all* Member States to report on their progress being made in preventing terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, resolutions in the First Committee dealing with nuclear disarmament or a nuclear-weapon-free world are annually watered down and rarely supported by the nuclear weapon states.

Another major challenge is the lack of implementation of resolutions dealing with international security and disarmament by Member States. This was an issue continually addressed by Under Secretary General Nobuyasu Abe throughout the First Committee. While many resolutions are considered a demonstration of a Member States' commitment to a certain policy issue, they are not legally binding and therefore not strictly enforced. In certain cases,

Member States may not consider a resolution in their national security interests and will either vote against it or abstain from voting, demonstrating their lack of support.

The absence of implementation is also a result of the lack of political will by Member States. Member States are usually restricted by instructions coming from their capitals and capitals rarely change their policy positions, particularly with respect to security and disarmament related issues. In fact, one of the weaknesses of UNDDA was its inability to adequately address the problem of implementation. Though it is ultimately the responsibility of Member States to implement, it is also the role of the UN Secretariat to help facilitate implementation. And, as UNDDA is the smallest department at the UN, much of the time, it is under-staffed and over-worked, an issue that proved to be a significant weakness in the organization. With the intense demands of international security-related issues constantly challenging the UN system, it would seem logical that the departments structured to deal with those challenges were large, well-funded and adequately staffed.

In addition, unconventional threats to international security are now a major concern for Member States and the UN. It is no longer simply State actors that pose a threat to Member States, but non-State actors as well. This has ties with the terrorism issue, however this area is also somewhat vague. One of the major debates at the General Assembly was the *definition* of terrorism and terrorist acts committed by “non-state actors.” Most Middle-Eastern nations argued that some of these acts could be considered acts of ‘freedom-fighting’, while Western representatives argued the opposite, that they were acts of terrorism, violence and aggression. It is clear that there is still no agreement among Member States on what to do about terrorism as they have yet to clearly define what it is.

In conclusion, the UNDDA in New York’s four major external security challenges are:

- The shift in focus from nuclear disarmament to terrorism in the last four years.
- A lack of implementation of resolutions dealing with international security and disarmament.
- A lack of political will by Member States.
- The unconventional threats to international security.

Findings

Using the observables determined prior to departure for the IPSS internship program, it was possible to conclude that the organizations themselves function relatively well. They are capable of affecting internal change when necessary, and are successful in meeting the majority of the requirements established in their mandate. Despite the bureaucratic nature of all of these organizations, it was shown that there is progress made internally to encourage efficiency, gender equality, effective cross-cultural communication, and adaptation to the changing needs of the organizations.

The CTBTO, although it is a young organization, has the power to assess and implement internal policies, such as sexual harassment and conflict resolution. The IAEA responded to criticism on Iraq’s hidden weapons program by establishing an additional protocol, and is also making great strides in the realm of gender mainstreaming. The flow of information and the decision-making process of the OPCW appear to be highly capable in times of emergency, and cross-cultural communication receives good marks. UNDDA-Geneva has a highly qualified

staff that carries out the mandate of the organization with efficiency, and presented little difficulty in terms of cross-cultural communication and gender mainstreaming. UNDDA-New York has developed strong working partnerships with many international organizations and non-governmental organizations, and has put gender mainstreaming policy into action. However, inefficiency proved to be very evident in every organization when discussion shifted to their relationships with Member States.

The inability of Member States to work cohesively with the CTBTO to develop new, effective policies is stunting the Treaty and the organization from fulfilling their objectives. Verification conducted by the OPCW is limited by the number of inspections that can be carried out yearly and by the lack of funds available to the organization, as well as high degrees of non-compliance with various parts of the CWC among States Parties. Obtaining consensus among the 65 members of the CD in Geneva is for all practical purposes impossible, due to a small number of countries that are unable to reach agreement even about the order of the agenda items. Because the CD is unable to reach consensus on its agenda, serious shadows can be cast upon its ability to reach consensus on substantive issues. In terms of the security challenges of UNDDA-New York, in certain cases Member States may not consider a resolution in their national security interests and will either vote against it or abstain from voting, demonstrating their lack of support. The absence of implementation is also a result of the lack of political will by Member States.

Therefore based on the analysis provided in previous sections, it was found that the ineffectiveness of the nonproliferation regime is due to external rather than internal factors that are referred to here as “diplomatic impasse”. Diplomatic impasse is comprised of seven elements: 1) lack of political will, 2) non-compliance of treaty obligation, 3) lack of leadership, 4) waste/lack of funding, 5) watered-down treaties, 6) current relevance of treaties, and 7) overall unutilized potential of the organizations observed.

Possible Options for Improvement of Effectiveness

The following are options have been identified based on the professional assignments of the five IPSS students. Not all of these options are equally applicable to the individual experiences of the IPSS participants.

Regional Approach to Nonproliferation Challenges

It can be noticed that the majority of international conflicts in the field of security and nonproliferation have a regional origin. Some countries acquired, or have tried to acquire, WMD in order to deter their neighbors and some decide on their national security doctrine based on the perceived threat from their neighbors.

Regional approaches would provide a more effective means of finding solutions to nonproliferation challenges than in global, multilateral regimes. Decisions made at an international level or within the context of international organizations in the field of security have a better chance of being implemented at the smaller-scale of different regions. International organizations and their decision makers should focus on the needs and resources of each region, and make decisions based on the region. Moreover, States Parties within a region should work together. It would be easier for regional States Parties to maximize efficiency by complementing

their resources and having more regional independence to implement regional security needs. Countries within a region usually share a common history, language and even culture, and if these countries also find a way to tie their economies or trade together, they would never risk economic growth to engage in war with each other.

Improving Efficiency

One of the greatest challenges that the IPSS students observed about their organizations was the lack of efficiency and the slow-moving nature of the nonproliferation and disarmament process. For example, the UN and the IAEA are both large bureaucracies with enormous tasks that sometimes overwhelm the organizations themselves. One possible solution would be to consider simple, administrative or procedural changes to help move the work process forward faster. For example, in most international organizations and large bureaucracies, there is an enormously long protocol for the production of reports. If one or two steps in this procedure were eliminated, perhaps things would move along faster and they could go from the conceptual phase to the implementation phase much faster.

In terms of reform of the UN system, one possible way to keep the organization alive and efficient would be to continually recruit “fresh blood” into the system via young diplomats and junior professionals. This would help eliminate the threat of the organization lacking the ability to address new challenges of current and future generations.

Additionally, there is a sense that a lot of unutilized potential within these organizations exists, some of which could possibly be directed toward the area of natural disasters. For example, the CTBTO could have been tremendously helpful prior to the December 26th tsunami that struck South Asia as it has the monitoring equipment and technology to detect such a natural disaster. The OPCW and the IAEA also have potential for assisting in such situations related to chemical and nuclear weapon-related accidents or natural disasters.

A Different Approach to Multilateralism

As has been shown, the current impasse of progress in the nonproliferation regime stems from the international community not being able to come to consensus on key issues. It is because of this stall in progressive action within the international community that a serious lack of security has developed within the nonproliferation regime. A new shift in nonproliferation policy within the international community is needed.

As opposed to the demand for consensus on a multilateral level, the international community should consider a new way to address international security needs within nonproliferation. The current multilateral, consensus-based nonproliferation organizations should be shifted from a role of actors to a role of leaders. The organizations should focus on what needs to be done and ways to achieve more effective nonproliferation policies. The multilateral international nonproliferation organizations should serve as the leaders in the nonproliferation regime. The actors that should engage in positive policies should be the States. In order for the States to work successfully though, they should consider a bilateral approach. With each State having a vast network of bilateral relations with other States with similar bilateral networks, a system of checks and balances could be established to achieve a common goal. It will be through this web of bilateral relations that States will be able to act with more freedom to engage needed policies. This is due to the fact that the current organizations are

somewhat restricted by having to reach consensus with too many different members. The failure to implement policy has created a dilemma in the advancement of security in the nonproliferation regime. The nonproliferation organizations must lead the way by bringing light to key issues that need to be addressed and by attempting to resolve these issues. One possible approach would be through a web of bilateral relations through which States fully implement the needed policies to address the security needs of the nonproliferation regime. This is not to say that multilateralism should be completely eliminated. However, including more bilateral approaches to the negotiation process could enhance the nonproliferation and security environment.

If there is a shift from multilaterally stalled organizations moving from actors to leaders, and if there is a shift from States moving to a more active role in implementation of policy through a web of bilateral relations, then the nonproliferation regime could possibly see an advancement in its effectiveness and productivity.

Simple Majority Decision Making

The consensus-based negotiations of the CD are ideal in theory, because no agreement will be made until all countries concur. However, for the exact same reason, consensus-based negotiations are futile in practice. Consensus results in three principal outcomes. First, agreements made are so watered-down that they provide no teeth. Second, they take so long to negotiate that once they enter into force they do not recognize new security challenges, or do not provide adequate flexibility to adapt to the new challenges. Finally, no agreements can be reached resulting in a stalemate within the CD, as is the present case.

A recommendation that could be made is that voting take place using a simple majority. This would force the CD to negotiate in a more constructive manner. Simply saying “no” would not suffice, it would be necessary to meet with other countries that share interests and build coalitions. It would provide for less political power struggles between a small number of countries. It would still provide for a relatively equal voice for all countries involved, since it would be necessary to have coalition building to obtain a majority. This would also allow for stronger agreements that offer greater flexibility to deal with future security challenges, while still being democratic.

Leadership

Strong international leadership on the subject of nonproliferation is compulsory and has the potential to revolutionize the regime and break apart the current diplomatic deadlock. Today, there is a shared feeling among many NNWS that they are shouldering the lion’s share of NPT’s burden. They have pledged to forgo the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons in part because the NWS themselves pledged to work towards nuclear disarmament. Since true disarmament progress has been never taken place on an acceptable scale a growing feeling of distrust permeated the field of nonproliferation and has made NNWS unwilling to take extra steps towards their own commitments under the Treaty. If tomorrow the United States pledged to decrease its nuclear arsenal in half, the rest of the world would surely follow suit and make good on their commitments against nuclear weapons as well. This would also remove from the table the most commonly-cited reason for NNWS to not abide to their nonproliferation commitments. It could also give the world’s nuclear leaders the legitimacy to expect more from States that continually fail in their nonproliferation pledges.

Effective leadership must also be exerted to update the outdated nonproliferation treaties, which were forged during the Cold War with a 1950's mindset. A diplomatic conference could be organized to bring together states with a central commitment to revamping nonproliferation treaties. Leverage could be exerted on States to attend in much the same way that nonproliferation "cartels" work like the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the like. Additionally, world leaders should embrace existing framework like the Preparatory and Review Committees of the NPT and exert political force in a diplomatic and incorporated manner to build a coalition of states with similar interests: international security with the counter proliferation as the keystone. Other international forums should be reformed under the strong political direction to reflect the realities of the 21st Century like the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governor's. The former, the supposed collective security enforcer, must be redesigned to represent regional and world economic and military powers unlike its current form, which echoes the balance of power after of the Second World War. But today, since the Council is an unrepresentative body, it is highly prone to politicization. And the latter, the Board, must be revamped so that its 35 State membership is not occupied by members in poor standing with the Agency. Currently, states who are the subject of decisions occupy the Board; this is tantamount to a defendant being in the jury on his own trial.

Conclusions

The findings and recommendations presented in this paper are the result of an analytical approach to evaluating these five international nonproliferation organizations. They are based on the five observables determined before departure: organizational life, gender mainstreaming, organizational partnering, conflict resolution and negotiation, and cross-cultural communication. These five observables were decided upon so that the interns could analyze the organizations using the same perspective. Conclusions were drawn using the results of the analysis of the observables, and the assessment of the overall security challenges facing the nonproliferation regime. As a result, it was found that the organizations are relatively effective, despite the fact that the majority of these organizations were established decades ago. This report shows that the ineffectiveness of the nonproliferation regime is due to the organizations' source of power, namely States Parties.

This situation can be illustrated by the following anecdote. When the land was donated to the League of Nations for the construction of the Palais des Nations in Geneva, there was a clause included in the deed that peacocks should always be allowed to roam the property. Today, peacocks can be found all around the United Nations Office in Geneva. In 2000, when all the heads-of-state came to the Palais des Nations for the Millennium Summit, strict instructions were given to the chauffeurs of the national leaders that they were to drive through the entrance at Pregny Gate and not stop for any reason until they arrived at the next security checkpoint. As a car containing one of the presidents entered Pregny Gate, one such free-roaming peacock wandered out onto the road. Since the driver was given instructions not to stop for any reason, the peacock was run over. For anyone who has had the opportunity to visit the Palais des Nations, the peacocks have come to represent in a certain way the United Nations. The fact that the peacock was run over by a national leader symbolizes the argument of this report. As Member States continue to put their own national security interests above those of the global

community, this is done to the detriment of the international organizations that were established for the purpose of providing global security.

IPSS Fall 2004 Returning Students Biographies and Work Experience

Cristian Ion:

Mr. Cristian Ion is currently a Masters candidate in International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). He is focusing his studies on international security and nonproliferation. As part of the International Professional Service Semester (IPSS), Mr. Ion interned at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) during the Fall 2004 semester. He served as a junior political officer in the Assistance and Protection Branch (APB). Mr. Ion assisted in the efforts undertaken by OPCW to develop and improve the international and national capacity of States Parties of delivery of assistance in case of chemical incidents. Mr. Ion also became a UN civil military coordinator in case of disaster relief operations as part of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). While at MIIS, he was a Graduate Research Assistant at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), and a Research Associate for First Watch International. Mr. Ion also interned at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. During his internship, he worked on the Education for Disarmament Program and the Disarmament for Humanitarian Action Program. He also assisted the UNIDIR Director to the Conference on Disarmament and worked shortly for the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

Mr. Ion earned Honors B.A. Degrees in International Relations, Chemistry and French from Oregon State University. During this time, Mr. Ion studied two years in Lyon, France. While in Lyon, he also interned for ten months at the Organic Synthesis and Methodology Laboratory at the Lyon School of Chemistry Physics and Electronics (CPE), where he worked on the synthesis of flavopiridol—a molecule with anti-tumor effects in humans.

Summary of Work Experience at OPCW in The Hague

During the period of August through December 2004, Mr. Ion worked as a junior political officer in the Assistance and Protection Branch (APB) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, The Netherlands. While at the OPCW, his main tasks focused on paragraph 7 of Article X, which deals with offers of assistance made by States Parties in case of emergency response and with the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the OPCW and the States Parties. He developed a qualitative and quantitative analysis offers made under Article X and worked together with the Inspectorate, the Policy Review Branch and States Parties on creating ways to clarify the offers. Mr. Ion also worked directly with other APB and Legal Office and Member State delegates from various States Parties in negotiating bilateral agreements on Article X of CWC. He developed new bilateral agreement drafts and developed strategies for better negotiations techniques to be conducted in the future and reported on the current status of bilateral agreements during the Annual Assistance Workshop.

Mr. Ion also assisted major OPCW conferences such as the National Authority meeting, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties by meeting with various delegations to discuss possible offers of assistance by Member States. Additionally, he also worked closely with and provided advice to the developer of the databank of assistance under Article X of CWC regarding the type of information to be included and format of pages on unilateral offers and bilateral agreements. He also helped with administrative and logistical tasks for the coordination of courses, seminars and workshops organized by APB.

Christopher Landers:

Mr. Landers earned his undergraduate degree in East Asian Studies at Portland State University in Portland, Oregon. He is currently a Masters Candidate for May 2005 in International Policy Studies, specializing in Nonproliferation studies, at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. He first began his international focus while serving in the US Army Reserve Special Operations as a Psychological Operations Specialist and as a Korean linguist. While in the military, Mr. Landers traveled to Thailand to assist in the training of Thai Special Forces Soldiers on US equipment, tactics and protocol. Recently, while working at the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs Headquarters in New York, he began the development of a new process to assist in the successful negotiations of the Six Party Talks on the North Korean Nuclear crisis. In developing this new approach he was able to meet with numerous experts and various delegates from multiple countries, including a private meeting with North Korean Ambassador Han. It was in those meetings that he was able to discuss the possible implementation of the approach.

Summary of Work Experience at CTBTO Preparatory Commission Vienna

Mr. Landers work with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission was separated into two sections, the Public Information (PI) and External Relations (ER) Departments.

While assigned to PI, Mr. Landers generated a list of abbreviations, a list of key terms (a glossary) and a Frequently Asked Questions list. All three are currently in the process of receiving approval for publishing on the CTBTO Preparatory Commission website and as a booklet for distribution by PI. In addition to these direct tasks, he also aided in reviewing the process of information dissemination within the PI, and aided in the compilation of teaching modules for PI to distribute to high school teachers as teaching plans. He also provided an outline on how to write a digest of daily news, which allows for a faster read and a more comprehensive view of the days happenings as opposed to general news clippings. He provided information for the teaching module on the general nonproliferation regime and guidance on sources to seek out for better comprehension of nonproliferation. Finally, he was able to participate in an On-Site Inspection field exercise to escort press officers in the exercise.

Mr. Landers worked with ER and provided country analyses of all non-ratified International Monitoring System host States (19 States). The reports proposed actions required to engage a selected State and in return suggested the State's actions needed to engage the CTBTO Prep Comm. Each report was then closed with a personal analysis of how to better

engage the selected State and how to acquire ratification by that State. He was also able to aid in writing a section regarding external influences on the CTBTO Preparatory Commission for a memo on ER's goals and future plans for Executive Secretary Hoffmann. In ongoing work for the CTBTO Prep Comm, he provided an analysis of the plausible outcomes of the upcoming NPT review conference and its respective effects on the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

James McMonigle:

James McMonigle, "Pat," graduated from Santa Clara University with a degree in Political Science. He has worked and studied in Europe and Central America. He has led fundraising and development projects in El Salvador, and with the help from other Santa Clara students he raised over \$10,000--primarily for education programs in that country. He and his wife have begun an endowment of over \$20,000 for underprivileged Salvadoran students to attend the University of Central America. After studying Arabic at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, he left to pursue a Master's degree at Washington State University and work as a graduate research assistant. There, he studied the political psychology of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and over the Thanksgiving holiday, he traveled to Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories to conduct graduate research. He performed on-the-ground interviews with diplomats, academics, ordinary citizens and delegates of international organizations. He transferred to Monterey Institute of International Studies in January of 2004 for a master's in International Policy Studies with a Certificate in Nonproliferation and worked for the Monterey based First Watch International as a research associate. He will graduate in May 2005. His interests are in foreign affairs and international security, particularly with regards to terrorism, the Middle East and South Asia.

Summary of Work Experience at the IAEA Vienna

As part of the International Professional Service Semester, he served in the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, Security and Verification Policy Coordination Section at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria. While at the Agency Pat wrote speeches and prepared issue briefs for top Agency officials as well as the Agency's section for the 2005 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference Press Kit. He coordinated the release of the 2004 Nuclear Suppliers Group Information Circular. Additionally, he attended and kept the section's notes at key meetings and conferences to include the sensitive and closed Expert's Group on the Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Cycle, the General Conference and the Board of Governor's meetings. His most interesting experience was his work on the Iranian nuclear program. He represented the Agency at a press conference by the National Council for the Resistance in Iran, a resistance group that announced a parallel clandestine and military nuclear program in the state. Following this he attended a restricted technical briefing on the Agency's Iran report and the November Board where the State was the central issue. His reports on the subject were restricted and released to selected top Agency officials. As part of his IPSS requirements, Pat produced a research project on the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle and lessons learned from the case of Iran's nuclear program.

Rebecca Schauer:

Rebecca Schauer will earn her graduate degree in International Policy Studies, with a specialization in Nonproliferation Studies, from the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in the spring of 2005. While studying at MIIS, she worked in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). As a graduate research assistant, she spent one semester in the Information Collections Branch, where she gathered articles relevant to research being done within CNS on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Additionally, she spent two semesters gathering information on the space launch capabilities of space faring nations, as well as the treaties and agreements relevant to outer space, and used that information to jointly create web pages on current and future space security for the CNS website.

During her time spent at MIIS, Ms. Schauer also participated in the International Professional Service Semester (IPSS), spending one semester working for the Conference on Disarmament Secretariat and Conference Support Branch of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. While at the Geneva Branch, Rebecca aided the Secretariat at conferences of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Biological Weapons Convention. She also attended seminars on Security Council Resolution 1540, the Open Skies Treaty, and Small Arms and Light Weapons collection efforts. As part of the academic component of the internship, she wrote an extensive research paper on the possibility of and motivations for Chinese development of anti-satellite weapons.

Prior to coming to MIIS, Ms. Schauer earned an M.A. in French from Middlebury College. She earned her B.A. in French from Bemidji State University in Minnesota, where she also minored in Political Science and Space Studies.

Summary of Experience at UNDDA Geneva:

Rebecca Schauer completed an International Professional Service Semester (IPSS) internship with the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Secretariat and Conference Support Branch (Geneva Branch) of the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA). Her work at the Geneva Branch consisted of three main elements. First, she attended conferences and seminars on nonproliferation and disarmament issues. These included seminars held by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on small arms and light weapons collection programs and the Open Skies Treaty, as well as a seminar on Security Council Resolution 1540 and its impact on the Biological Weapons Convention. She also attended conferences that took place in Geneva on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Biological Weapons Convention, and informal conferences on the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention. Second, Rebecca aided the Geneva Branch fulfill its mandate of providing secretariat, administrative, and substantive support to the conferences held in Geneva. She worked on participant registration, submission of national annual reports, and writing summary reports. Finally, as part of the requirements of the IPSS program, Rebecca wrote a substantial research project on the possibility of and motivations for a Chinese anti-satellite program.

Risa Mongiello:

Risa Mongiello is from Taos, New Mexico and received her undergraduate degree in Politics and International Relations from Scripps College in Claremont, California. She is in her second year at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in the Graduate School of International Policy Studies with a focus on nonproliferation and disarmament. Her course work at Scripps College and MIIS in the field of international relations has heightened her interest to work for a large international organization such as the United Nations. Her courses at MIIS have helped increase her knowledge, understanding and awareness of international policy, nonproliferation and disarmament related issues. In the fall of 2004, she participated in an internship at the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) in New York as part of the International Professional Service Semester (IPSS) at MIIS.

Ms. Mongiello's experience at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) as well as the Nonproliferation Education Program (NEP) provided her with an opportunity to do extensive research on the United Nations and its role in the fields of peace, security, nonproliferation and disarmament.

Her career objectives are to work in the field of international policy with an emphasis on international security, disarmament and nonproliferation. She would like to work for a governmental, nongovernmental or research organization in the future and her internship at UNDDA was an opportunity to help launch such career goals.

Summary of Work Experience at UNDDA New York

During Ms. Mongiello's service at the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), she worked for the WMD Branch in an effort to aid the Department with issues related to the General Assembly meeting. She worked with other UNDDA interns to take notes during the meeting and assist in the compilation of summary reports for the Department. Such reports were submitted to my supervisor, the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and the Secretary General of the UN.

In addition, she regularly drafted reports informing United Nations personnel, including the Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, on issues related to WMD. Also, she prepared monthly reports on the activities of the WMD Branch for the months of August, September, October, November and December. In addition, she regularly monitored developments in WMD issues through open source literature and distributed significant articles to other members of the Branch. Additionally, her responsibilities included taking notes at certain Departmental Substantive Meetings, according to the assignment schedule. And she assisted in the efforts of the WMD Branch in any new projects that arose, particularly with respect to the General Assembly, relevant Security Council meetings and issues related to the 1540 Committee regarding terrorist acquisition of WMD.

In order to fulfill the requirements for the International Professional Service Semester (IPSS), Ms. Mongiello conducted a research project during her time spent with the WMD Branch of

UNDDA. For this project, she produced a paper examining the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the progress that has been made in implementation of Article VI concerning nuclear disarmament. She examined the events that have taken place over the last four years leading up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference in an effort to analyze the reasons why limited progress has been made in the area of nuclear disarmament.